RECENT CASES
directly liable to the injured party only by statute. Throckmorton's Ann. Code Ohio
1929, § 951o-4. The court might have modified and applied one of the exceptions to
the rule, namely, that a person vicariously liable for the tort of another can indemnify
himself from the wrongdoer. Since the defendant insurance company was not a tortfeasor, the court might have allowed the plaintiff not the severe remedy of indemnity,
but contribution from the defendant. (2) The right of contribution is not based upon
contract, but upon the equitable maxim "equality is equity." Deering v. Winchelsea,
2 Bos. & P. 270, 1 Cox 318 (1787); Stearnes, Suretyship 473 (2d ed. 3915). It is available in many widely different situations when one party has "relieved them of a common burden and hence they ought to reimburse him for their proportionate part of his
loss" (2 Williston, Contracts §1278 (1920)). Ward v. Ward's Heirs, 40 W.Va. 611, 21
S.E. 746 (r895) (necessary repairs on common property made by one co-tenant);
Asylum of St. Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N.Y. 375, 146 N.E. 632 (1925) (broker
criminally but effectively pledged securities of several parties, pledge sold A's to
satisfy debt); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Walker, 45 Ohio St. 577, i6 N.E. 475 (1888)
(one railroad paid for maintenance and repairs of common crossing which statute made
joint duty of both railroads). Contribution exists among cosureties, and the plaintiff
in the instant case contended that they and defendants were cosureties by virtue of the
statute (Throckmorton's Ann. Code Ohio 1929, § 9510-4) which made the joint judgment the direct liability of the insurers, thus constituting the common obligation with
the injured party as the common principal. Because the court would not accept this
theory, they refused any relief. But in doing this they ignored the equitable nature of
contribution, and the fact that it is permitted in many cases where there is no contractual relationship between the parties.
Although these ideas might have disposed of the principal case the great mass of
cases involving contribution among joint tortfeasors would remain under the old rule.
The remedy lies with the legislature.

Trusts-Liability of Settlor of Trust for Her Minor Children on National Bank
Stock Held by the Trust-[Federal.-In 1926 the settlor transferred national bank
stock in two banks to trustees for the benefit of her minor children reserving no control over the trust or the trustees. In 1931, one of the banks became insolvent, and the
receiver thereof, after having collected and realized on the remaining funds of the
trust which were insufficient to cover the assessment, sued to recover the balance from
the settlor under the shareholder's liability clause of the National Banking Act, 38
Stat. 273 (1913), 12 U.S.C.A. § 64 (1927). Held, no recovery. Pottorff v. Dean, 77 F.
(2d) 893 (C.C.A. Ist 1935).
A transfer of bank stock, to relieve the transferor of liability, need not be made to a
financially responsible party if made in good faith, Earle v. Carson, 188 U.S. 42 (1903);
Sykesv . Halloway, 81 Fed. 432 (C. C. Ky. 1897), but it must be made to a party capable
of accepting and holding the stock. Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (D.C. N.D.
19o4). A transfer of shares to a minor does not release the transferor from liability to
assessment because a minor is without legal capacity to assume this statutory obligation. Earlyv. Richardson, 380 U.S. 496 (193o); Fosterv. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. Vt.
i896); 43 Harv. L. Rev. Iso (193I).
Under the National Banking Act, I3 Stat. 118 (1864), 12 U.S.C.A. § 66 (1927),
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trustees are released from personal liability. Fowler v. Gowing, 165 Fed. 89I (C.C.A.
2d i9o8); McNair v. Darragh,31 F. (2d) 9o6 (C.C.A. 8th 1929); Heiden v. Cremin, 66 F.
(2d) 943 (C.C.A. 8th 1933). At common law, the plaintiff could have proceeded against
the trustees who were liable personally to assessment. Muir v. City of Glasgow Bank,
4 A.C. 337 (1789); 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 720, 721 (1935).
The settlors are held liable when the transfer to the trust was not in good faith.
Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U.S. ' (x898); Sykes v. Halloway, 81 Fed. 432 (C.C. Ky. 1897);
or when the trustee acts as an agent, English v. Gamble, 26 F. (2d) 28 (1928); or when
he retains power of modification, Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1929); or when the
transfer is within the statutory time limit of 6o days. 38 Stat. 273 (1913), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 64 (1927); or when the cestui disclaims the trust. Jervis v. Wolferstan, i8 Eq. 18
(1874) (settlor's estate held for assessment on stock when remaindermen of trust disclaim). The same is true when the settlor places bank stock in trust and takes participating certificates. Keyes v. American Life and Accident Ins. Trust, i F. Supp. 512
(D. C. Ky. 1932); Laurent v. Anderson, 7o F. (2d) 8ig (C.C.A. 6th 1934) (cases do not
indicate positively whether party is held as settlor or as cestui).
While the facts in the principal case do not come directly within any of these exceptions, the result has enabled the settlor to do indirectly what she could not have done
directly. The benefits of the trust have been enjoyed by her minor children and necessarily also by herself. And yet the statutory protection for creditors of closed banks
has been avoided.
The result raises important questions. Would the result have been the same if the
settlor's husband had been named the cestui? What if the settlor had named herself
beneficiary of an irrevocable trust? With the principal case in view, it seems absurdly
simple for a holder of bank stock to avoid liability and retain the benefits. It may mean
that the National Banking Act is in need of amendment on this point to guard against
abuse of this device.

